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I. INTRODUCTION 
Picture a person.  What do they look like?  Are they a fully-formed 
human being, capable of communicating advanced ideas?  A toddling 
child?  A fertilized egg in a petri dish?  International human rights law 
attempts to advance a recommended set of protections for governments to 
follow when enacting laws for their citizenry.1  But what is a “human”?  Do 
human rights protections extend to embryos created in the course of 
infertility treatment and stored in freezers for later use?  If so, what might 
this mean for assisted reproductive technologies such as in-vitro 
fertilization (IVF), in which the creation and development of embryos 
looms so large? 
Granting embryos personhood has significant implications for IVF—an 
area of medical practice that renders procreative sex2 unnecessary for 
impregnation.  IVF is an increasingly popular option for those who wish to 
conceive a child.3  During the IVF procedure, an egg is fertilized by a 
sperm out-of-utero; the resulting embryo is then implanted in the uterine 
wall of either a biological or gestational mother.4  During IVF (and 
1. International Human Rights Law, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
2. “Procreative sex” as used here refers to penile-vaginal sex between two fertile
people undertaken for the purposes of conceiving a child. 
3. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 91 n.1 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Kindregan & McBrien] 
(describing briefly the evolution and gradual acceptance of the in vitro fertilization 
process).  
4. See id. at 91.  When the person carrying the pregnancy is also the egg provider,
that person is considered the genetic or biological parent.  When the person carrying 
the pregnancy is not the egg provider, that person is called the gestational mother, or 
surrogate.  
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procreative sex), a sperm that meets an egg creates a zygote, which is 
considered an embryo from the moment of conception until about the 
eighth week of pregnancy.5 
Since IVF is about 35% effective at producing a viable pregnancy,6 
medical practitioners recommend that those looking to conceive via IVF 
fertilize several eggs at a time.7  The process of egg retrieval is expensive, 
painful, and arguably dangerous.8  Thus, rather than repeat the entire 
process each time, couples may choose to freeze “leftover” pre-
implantation embryos to use in the future, either to try for more children or 
for use in case of an unsuccessful implantation.9  If embryos are granted 
personhood status under the law, these “leftovers” could be considered 
people, with all the rights that a person has under each nation’s 
constitution.10  Disposal or destruction of these embryos would be 
tantamount to murder, potentially for both the parents and the medical 
personnel assisting in the IVF process.11 
This Article analyzes the legal personification of embryos worldwide 
through the lens of human rights treaties.  Its scope concerns the pre-
implantation embryo—namely, embryos conceived as a result of assisted 
reproductive technology12 for the specific purpose of in-vitro fertilization.13  
Assertions in this Article are based on three interlocking assumptions:  (1) 
5. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (9th ed. 2009) (“zygote”); see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (9th ed. 2009) (“embryo”). 
6. According to a 2006 study conducted in the United States.  See KINDREGAN &
MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 95. 
7. See id. at 94.
8. Id. at 95; see also Carlene Hempel, Golden Eggs, BOS. GLOBE (June 25, 2006),
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/magazine/articles/2006/06/25/golden_eggs/ (noting 
the potential dangers of egg retrieval, particularly during the donation process). 
9. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 94 (discussing
cryopreservation). 
10. Ashley Pittman, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Status of the
Embryo, 81 MISS. L.J. 99, 99 (2011) [hereinafter Pittman]. Notably, but beyond the 
scope of this article, embryonic personhood also has legal implications for birth 
control, tax law, ectopic pregnancies, abortion, miscarriages, and stem cell research. 
See id. at 101 (noting implications of embryonic personhood for inheritance and 
custody as well); see also Ed Goldman, The Conflict Between Fetal Personhood Laws 
and Women’s Rights, JURIST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/ed-
goldman-personhood-laws.php (discussing the legal implications of personhood laws in 
the United States).   
11. See Pittmann, supra note 10, at 100.
12. See generally KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 1-4 (providing a
general overview of ART in the United States). 
13. See id. at 91.
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once rights are granted to a developing entity, they cannot be lost at a later 
stage of development; (2) if a country declares that a fetus is not a legal 
person, it likely will not grant an embryo personhood; and (3) if a fetus has 
legal personhood at a young fetal age, a country may be more apt to find 
that a fertilized embryo is a person.  In other words, when discussing a 
continuum of rights, a country is unlikely to find that 
reproductive materials14 possess rights, then lose them, and then regain 
them at a certain point in pregnancy.15   
This Article analyzes the rights that are triggered when considering 
embryonic personhood status through the lens of human rights treaties and 
case law from both United Nations-based and regionally-based 
international bodies.16  This Article argues that the very idea of embryonic 
personhood is incompatible with the right to privacy, the right to life, and 
the principle of non-discrimination.  It further argues that in the absence of 
an explicit pronouncement declaring IVF to be encompassed under an 
existing human right, it can and should be included where treaty bodies 
issue reports and recommendations on reproductive rights. 
Part II introduces the concept of personhood and discusses the potential 
implications of pre-implantation embryonic personhood on IVF and those 
who access IVF, in addition to the reproductive justice implications of IVF 
access.  Part III analyzes the concept of personhood under human rights 
law, concluding that current human rights treaties could be read either to 
support or discourage legal personification of embryos, depending on who 
interprets the treaties and which rights are emphasized.  Part IV reviews 
international personhood legislation, with a focus on countries that have 
addressed cases specific to embryonic personhood.  Part V briefly 
addresses international bioethical pronouncements on embryos, and what 
that may mean in the context of how embryos will be treated under human 
rights law.  Part VI synthesizes the overall treatment of personhood by 
human rights bodies, and questions whether this will hurt or harm 
burgeoning IVF technology. 
II. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PERSONHOOD ON IVF
A zygote is considered an embryo from the moment of conception until 
14. “Reproductive materials,” as used in this Article, refers to the immediate
materials necessary to create biological life (e.g., sperm, eggs, and the joining of sperm 
and egg to create a zygote or embryo).   
15. See Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right—
International and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 267 (2008) 
(articulating a similar statement). 
16. With the caveat that rights other than those discussed here could certainly be
triggered in contexts that are not explored in this Article. 
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about the eighth week of pregnancy.17  Is this embryo a human being? 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “person” is “a human being.”18  
Thus, only persons are “members of the human family”19 or “human 
beings.”20  It follows then that human rights treaties cover only persons, but 
at what point during development does reproductive material constitute a 
legal person covered by human rights treaties? 
As a question of domestic law in the United States, it bears noting that 
regulation of assisted reproductive technology (ART) does not provide an 
answer.  As it stands now, ART—such as IVF—is legally under-
regulated.21  The status of the embryo is contested in the United States,22 
and the only federal regulation that exists states that where embryo disposal 
has been addressed under state law, the parents are generally allowed to 
dispose of the embryos when they are ready to do so, as long as both 
parents agree.23  Thus, under the few domestic legal regulations governing 
IVF, embryos are not considered persons.24 
International law provides a more complete answer to the embryonic 
personhood debate.  International human rights law outlines rights that 
governments should protect and provide—and, in the case of governments 
that have signed and ratified human rights treaties, which rights 
governments are obligated to protect and provide.25  Because of the 
17. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (9th ed. 2009) (“zygote”); see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (9th ed. 2009) (“embryo”). 
18. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009) (“person”).
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
20. Id. at 1.
21. See KINDREGAN, & MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 31-32.  But see Lynn D.
Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and Parentage by Assisted Reproduction, 
35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 416-21 (2006) (discussing both direct and indirect regulation 
of ART in the United States).   
22. See, e.g., Robin E. Sosnow, Genetic Material Girl:  Embryonic Screening, the
Donor Child, and the Need for Statutory Reform, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 609, 
625-26 (2012). 
23. See Pittmann, supra note 10, at 100.  A notable exception is Louisiana, which
has explicitly disallowed destruction of embryos and given them quasi-human status by 
calling IVF embryos a “juridical person.”  Id. at 101. 
24. It is worth noting that the implications for embryonic personhood, particularly
in the United States where IVF is popular, are great.  Embryonic personhood would 
likely lead to parents or clinics not being permitted to destroy or freeze embryos.  It 
would also likely force clinics into guardianship status of unused embryos, causing 
both financial and judicial complications.  See Pittmann, supra note 10, at 101.   
25. See What are Human Rights?, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Apr. 
21, 2014).   
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potential for the destruction of embryos inherent in the majority of IVF 
procedures,26 granting personhood to embryos would mean that embryo 
destruction is murder27 and a violation of the right to life, among other 
rights.28  Even if no embryos were destroyed during the IVF process, 
embryonic storage and preservation would also take on a new hue, colored 
by the fact that under this articulation, IVF would require the cryogenic 
freezing of human beings.29  If an embryo is a person, and therefore entitled 
to protection under human rights law, government allowance or regulation 
of IVF may be a violation of international human rights law.30 
A. Who Is Affected by Access to IVF? 
The desire to become a genetic parent is strong for many individuals.31  
26. See Pittmann, supra note 10, at 99.
27. See id. at 100.
28. Ostensibly, embryonic personhood could mean that embryos possess the whole
panoply of human rights possibly applicable to them, such as the right to health 
(meaning embryos must be stored in such a way that they are kept healthy), the right to 
non-discrimination (including its implications for Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 
which allows for the selection of certain traits), and the right not to be held in slavery 
(with attendant repercussions for the buying and selling of embryos).  
29. Cf. Pittman, supra note 10, at 99. This is not intended to downplay the
possibility of a middle ground – where embryos are not quite human beings, but are 
treated with more respect than non-humans.  See Michael J. Meyer & Lawrence J. 
Nelson, Respecting What We Destroy, SANTA CLARA UNIV. MARKKULA CTR. FOR
APPLIED ETHICS, 
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/respect.html (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2014) (“The first false absolute is that it’s always morally wrong to destroy 
human embryos, because extracorporeal human embryos [that is, embryos existing 
outside the human body] have the same moral status as human persons.  The other 
unsound absolute is that it’s in no way whatsoever morally problematic to destroy 
embryos, because they have no moral worth at all; in short, destroying embryos is 
morally trivial.  Fortunately, an alternative moral view to these two problematic 
positions exists.  On this middle view, human embryos should be recognized as having 
modest moral worth.  Consequently we must have serious reasons to destroy them, and 
in such a case we must show respect for them when we destroy them.”). This is in fact 
the case in at least one state (see Pittman, supra note 10, at 100-101, discussing a 
Louisiana statute that elevates embryos to the status of juridical persons).  This Article 
instead seeks to explore how IVF could be affected by embryonic personhood, whether 
juridical or otherwise.  
30. See infra Part III for a discussion on the enforceability of human rights law;
see also Rosalie Silberman Abella, International Law and Human Rights: The Power 
and the Pity, 55 MCGILL L.J. 871, 874 (2010) (noting that international law regarding 
trade is highly enforceable, whereas human rights law is not).   
31. See, e.g., Sydney Lupkin, IVF:  When Insurance Companies Won’t Pay, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/couples-extremes-pay-
ivf/story?id=17575724 (discussing the lengths to which people will go to fund their 
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Because science has advanced to the point where it is possible to conceive 
a genetic child without procreative sex via IVF, the time has come for a 
conversation about whether infertility – in all its forms – invokes a 
corresponding right to procreate, and for whom.  Though articulating the 
contours of the right to procreate is beyond the scope of this Article,32 it 
will address the reasons people may need or choose to use IVF to have 
genetically related children.  In this way, the Article will provide 
information regarding the range of people potentially affected by the over-
regulation or restriction of IVF. 
When discussing ART and the hierarchy of access to such technologies, 
scholars have articulated at least three types of infertility:  medical, social, 
and elective.33  Medical infertility refers to infertility that occurs because of 
a medical issue, while social infertility occurs as a result of sexual 
relationships – either lack thereof or same-sex relationships – which render 
an individual or a couple unable to engage in procreative sex.34  Elective or 
lifestyle infertility refers to the process of the preservation of reproductive 
materials for ART while still fertile in order to delay reproduction.35  As 
expected, scholars are in disagreement about how certain procedures 
should be classified, and which types of procedures should be covered by 
insurance.36  Also, although it is beyond the scope of this Article, surrogacy 
is a closely related medical procedure that is often used in relationship with 
ART, and a brief explanation of surrogacy is necessary in order to clarify 
how IVF is used in practice.37 
IVF procedures). 
32. It has, however, been explored extensively by other scholars, most notably
Carter Dillard, who manages to synthesize the majority of legal thought around the 
procreative right.  See, e.g., Carter Dillard, Valuing Having Children, 12 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 151, 153 (2010) (analyzing whether a right to procreate is feasible and can be 
supported by existing legal authority); Carter Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 
10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 27-37 (2007) (situating the procreative right within 
international human rights law and comparative law).   
33. Irit Rosenblum, Being Fruitful and Multiplying:  Legal, Philosophical,
Religious, and Medical Perspective on Assisted Reproduction in Israel and 
Internationally, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 627, 629 (2013).   
34. Cf. id. (defining medical and social infertility).
35. Cf. id. (defining elective or lifestyle fertility).
36. See Lisa Campo Engelstein, For the Sake of Consistency and Fairness:  Why
Insurance Companies Should Cover Fertility Preservation Treatment for Iatrogenic 
Infertility, in ONCOFERTILITY:  ETHICAL, LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND MEDICAL PERSPECTIVES 
381, 381-87 (Teresa K. Woodruff et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Engelstein].   
37. See generally KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 151-56 (describing
surrogacy and its relationship to ART). 
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Surrogacy, when used with IVF, is referred to as gestational surrogacy.38  
During gestational surrogacy, an egg is fertilized with sperm outside of the 
body to create an embryo, and then that embryo is implanted in a non-
genetic birth parent who acts as the carrier for the pregnancy.39  This is 
different from traditional surrogacy, where a couple or single person 
contracts with an outside party and the outside party’s own eggs are 
fertilized via alternative insemination.40  Surrogacy is the only way for 
same-sex male couples to have children that are genetically related to one 
of the partners,41 and frequently the law only protects gestational surrogacy 
and not non-gestational surrogacy.42 
Co-maternity (also called ovum sharing) is a form of surrogacy 
sometimes used by same-sex female couples in order to allow both parties 
to participate in the biological process of procreation.43  In co-maternity, 
one partner’s egg is fertilized outside of her body using donor sperm, and 
then the fertilized embryo is implanted in the other partner’s womb.44  In 
this way, one partner is the genetic mother, and the other partner is the birth 
mother. 
Whether medical, social, or elective, the following people may seek 
access to IVF treatments: 
1. Single People or Couples Seeking Fertility Preservation
Fertility preservation occurs when people cryopreserve reproductive
materials – either eggs or sperm – for later use.45  People seek out fertility 
preservation for a number of reasons.  They may be transitioning from one 
gender to another in a procedure that would destroy their reproductive 
materials.46  They may also be diagnosed with cancer and seek to preserve 
38. See id. at 153-54.
39. See id. at 154.
40. See id. at 152, 154.
41. Barbara Stark, Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights Law,
18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 372 (2012) [hereinafter Stark]. 
42. Cf. id. at 155 (“Gestational surrogacy, although, legally speaking, a safer
alternative than traditional surrogacy, is not without potential complications.”). 
43. See William S. Singer, Exploring New Terrain:  Assisted Reproductive
Technology (ART), the Law and Ethics, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 918, 922 (2011) 
(describing co-maternity).  
44. Id.
45. What is Fertility Preservation?, REPROTECH LTD., 
http://www.reprotech.com/fertility-preservation.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
46. See Laura Nixon, The Right to (Trans) Parent: A Reproductive Justice
Approach to Reproductive Rights, Fertility, and Family-Building Issues Facing 
Transgender People, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73, 95-102 (2013) (providing a 
nuanced discussion of the reproductive justice implications for fertility preservation in 
8
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reproductive materials prior to undergoing chemotherapy, which is known 
to cause infertility in some circumstances.47  Other people may wish to 
preserve reproductive materials at a young age for use at a later age when 
they would not be as fertile, making it harder to conceive.48  Still others 
may use IVF either because pregnancy is medically dangerous for them or 
because they do not wish to be pregnant and instead wish to employ a 
gestational surrogate.49 
2. Same-Sex Couples
As explained above, same-sex couples are generally socially infertile
and, therefore, IVF is a method that same-sex couples can use to be 
genetically related to offspring.  In the case of same-sex couples, one or 
more partners may also be medically infertile or seeking to engage in 
fertility preservation. 
3. Single People
Single people are also often socially infertile and may choose IVF as a
way to be genetically related to their potential child.50  Single people may 
also be medically infertile, seeking to engage in fertility preservation, or 
may prefer IVF to artificial insemination.51 
4. Opposite sex couples with one or more medically infertile partner
This is the most common IVF story told in the media52 – an opposite sex
couple where one or more partners have fertility problems, but for whom 
transgender people). 
47. Fertility Preservation 101:  Cancer Treatment and Fertility Risks, REPROTECH 
LTD, http://www.reprotech.com/fertility-preservation-101.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2014). 
48. See Engelstein, supra note 36, at 381.
49. See Mayo Clinic Staff, In Vitro Fertilization (IFV): Why It’s Done, MAYO 
CLINIC (June 27, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-
fertilization/basics/why-its-done/prc-20018905 [hereinafter Mayo Clinic Staff] 
(explaining the different health conditions a woman or man might have that would lead 
them to utilize IVF).  
50. See Cosima Marriner, ‘Socially Infertile’ Thirtysomethings Turn to IVF,
MONASH IVF (Nov. 13, 2012), http://monashivf.com/socially-infertile-
thirtysomethings-turn-to-ivf/ (defining “socially infertile” as a woman who turns to 
IVF to conceive instead of waiting to find a partner). 
51. See Mayo Clinic Staff, supra note 49 (noting that women who are about to
start cancer treatment or who do not have a functional uterus may want to preserve 
their eggs for future use).  
52. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Transformative Reproduction, 16 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 187, 187 (2013) [hereinafter Mutcherson]. 
9
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IVF may be an option to still have a child that is genetically related to one 
or both of the partners.  This narrow conception of who needs access to 
IVF is actively harmful to a complete discussion of what the law might 
“owe to people who seek parenthood through ART.”53  A bigger picture 
regarding who barriers to accessing IVF will affect is important for 
understanding the types of human rights violations embryonic personhood 
may represent.  By using the framework of reproductive justice, this Article 
considers embryonic personhood and IVF as issues that affect a number of 
marginalized populations with great consequence.54 
B. Access to IVF as a Reproductive Justice Issue 
Reproductive justice (RJ) is a conceptual framework developed by 
women of color activists in the United States,55 and provides a way to view 
reproductive health and rights through an intersectional56 lens.  Viewing 
reproductive health and rights as impacted by personal and group identities 
– that is, through the reproductive justice framework – helps to situate these
concepts more clearly in a human rights context.  By taking intersectional 
identities into account, reproductive justice illuminates the variety of 
human rights classifications that are applicable to situations such as access 
to IVF.57 
The traditional reproductive rights and health movements within the 
human rights field – both national and international – often overlook or 
ignore the premise that rights without access mean very little to a majority 
of the population.58  In response to this limited view of the problems facing, 
53. Id. at 190.
54. And for this the author owes a great debt to Professor Kimberly M.
Mutcherson and her trailblazing article, Transformative Reproduction, which set a high 
bar for how to talk about ART as a reproductive justice issue. See id.  
55. LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, WHAT IS REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE? 1 n.1,
available at http://lsrj.org/documents/resources/What%20is%20RJ.pdf [hereinafter 
LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE.   
56. Intersectionality is the concept that the identities a person holds may impact
their experiences. In effect, an intersectional lens recognizes the way that identities, 
such as race, class, gender, sex, sexual orientation, ability, and immigration status] may 
impact reproductive “access, agency, and autonomy.” Id. at 1.  
57. Cf. Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights
Change Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 480-82 (2008) (providing a number of 
examples of how arguments for reproductive rights are more expansive and progressive 
when contextualized in a human rights framework).   
58. Cf. Loretta Ross, Understanding Reproductive Justice:  Transforming the Pro-
Choice Movement, 36 OFF OUR BACKS 14, 14 (2006) (noting that reproductive justice 
advocates “fight for the necessary enabling conditions to realize [the right to have a 
child, the right not to have a child, and the right to parent the children we have, as well 
10
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in particular, poor women and women of color, women of color activists 
combined reproductive health and social justice principles to create the 
term “reproductive justice.”59  Reproductive justice “will exist when all 
people can exercise the rights and access the resources they need to thrive 
and to decide whether, when, and how to have and parent children with 
dignity, free from discrimination, coercion, or violence.”60  Therefore, 
under RJ principles, all people who want to use IVF as a method of 
procreation – the “how” of the previous definition – should be allowed 
access, including funding as necessary, to IVF treatments.  Currently, this 
access – like the right to procreate – is limited by competing concerns.61  
As we move forward into the brave new world of reproductive 
technologies, RJ requires that we ask whether these technologies “enhance 
or oppress,”62 or both. 
Access to IVF as an RJ issue means that people seeking IVF should not 
be seen in a vacuum63 – they may be infertile, single, part of a same-sex 
couple, or wishing to engage in fertility preservation for any number of 
reasons, such as a plan to undergo a surgical gender transition, or a need to 
undergo chemotherapy.  Additionally, individuals may lack access to IVF 
due to cost or discrimination, among other things.64  RJ requires that the 
resources necessary for individuals to experience full reproductive 
autonomy and dignity are available, and this includes access to IVF and 
other ART.65 
as the right to control our birthing options, such as midwifery]”). 
59. LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, supra note 55, at 1 n.1.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Concerns include the medical safety of ART and ethics questions ART poses,
such as the regulation/allowance of transnational surrogacy arrangements.  See 
Mutcherson, supra note 52, at 203.  
62. Id. at 206; see also id. at 220-24 (exploring the notion of ART as reproductive
oppression as part of a full discussion of the potential for ART to create both 
reproductive justice and reproductive oppression).   
63. See id. at 199-200 (citation omitted) (“The hierarchies of the past persist when
society elevates the reproductive acts of those with race, class, and sexual orientation 
privilege above the reproductive acts of those who lack any or all such privileges.
Having a child, coitally or non-coitally, implicates race, gender, social status, 
immigration status, class, marital status, and a variety of other axes of social standing. 
This was the case when coital reproduction was the only way to make babies and it 
continues to be the case as more people have children through non-coital means of 
reproduction.  Within this framework, it is critical to understand and evaluate how 
categories of difference are salient in non-coital reproduction.”). 
64. See, e.g., id. at 200-204 (discussing cost as a barrier to accessing ART).
65. See generally LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY (2013), available at 
http://lsrj.org/documents/factsheets/13_Assisted_Repro_Technology.pdf.  However, RJ 
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The human rights of privacy, access to information, health, to benefit 
from advances in science and technology, to found a family (procreate), 
and reproductive rights in general can all be invoked under a variety of 
human rights treaties when discussing access to IVF.  Depending on the 
identities of the person or people involved in accessing IVF, a number of 
human rights treaties may be appropriate, including the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities,66 the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,67 the American Convention 
on Human Rights,68 or a number of other treaties.  Though not all of these 
rights and treaties are analyzed below, RJ principles are an illustration of 
the wide variety of approaches human rights provides for analyzing access 
to IVF. 
principles would not endorse someone receiving access to IVF “on the backs” of 
others, as detailed in a number of excellent articles exploring problems with surrogacy, 
most notably transnational surrogacy.  See Seema Mohapatra, Achieving Reproductive 
Justice in the International Surrogacy Market, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 190, 191 (2012); 
Mutcherson, supra note 52, at 203-04 (citing Nicole Bromfield, Global Surrogacy in 
India: Legal, Ethical and Human Rights Implications of a Growing “Industry,” RH
REALITY CHECK (June 11, 2010, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2010/06/10/stateless-babies-legal-ethical-human-
rights-issues-raised-growth-global-surrogacy-india); Miriam Perez, Surrogacy: The 
Next Frontier for Reproductive Justice, RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 23, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2010/02/23/surrogacy-next-frontier-reproductive-
justice; see also Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, 
Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 327 (2005). See 
generally Heather Widdows, Border Disputes Across Bodies: Exploitation in 
Trafficking for Prostitution and Egg Sale for Stem Cell Research, 2 INT’L J. FEMINIST 
APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 5 (2009) (asserting that egg “donation” is an exploitive 
practice that should not be endorsed by feminists).   
66. See Dr. Maya Sabatello, Who’s Got Parental Rights?  The Intersection
Between Infertility, Reproductive Technologies, and Disability Rights Law, 6 L.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL J. 227, 255-58 (2010) (citing Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. 
No. 49, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/61/49 (2006), entered into force May 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=259) (discussing ART in the context of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).  
67. See Stark, supra note 41, at 379-80 (discussing how the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is implicated in gestational 
surrogacy arrangements).  
68. See discussion infra Part IV: B on how the American Convention of Human
Rights has been used to articulate the denial of IVF as a violation of human rights. 
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III. PERSONHOOD IN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
A. How Does International Human Rights Law Work? 
Since there is no “world government,” nation-states have come together 
since 194869 in an attempt to establish governing international norms in 
regards to basic rights possessed by all individuals.  What follows is a brief 
overview of the international human rights law process as carried out by 
the United Nations (UN). 
Codified human rights are born through treaty processes:  states draft a 
document setting forth a group of rights, and then the document is formally 
presented for signature.70  A signature is an expression to be bound by a 
treaty.71  However, a state is not bound by a treaty until the treaty is 
ratified, and even then a sufficient number of state parties must ratify the 
treaty before the treaty becomes binding.72  The ratification process 
typically requires that the treaty go through the legislative process of the 
signing country, and, once approved, the treaty becomes binding law on 
that country.73  In some instances, states may help to draft a document but 
then refuse to sign it because they consider the final language used to 
articulate the rights unsatisfactory.74  In other instances, states may sign, 
but never ratify, a document.  Although signatory states are expected to 
comply with treaties, they are not legally bound to follow them—unlike 
states that have ratified the treaties.75 
69. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 2 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2004). 
70. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS HERE AND NOW:
CELEBRATING THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Nancy Flowers ed., 
1998), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/from-
concept.htm [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL]. 
71. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:  DILEMMAS IN WORLD 
POLITICS 5 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DONNELLY].  
72. Id.
73. See id. (explaining that in the United States, the president signs a treaty, which
then must go to the Senate for ratification). 
74. The United States is notorious for helping to draft and subsequently refusing to
sign human rights documents.  See, e.g., Cormac T. Connor, Human Rights Violations 
in the Information Age, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 230 (2001) (“In 1953, Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles asserted that the United States did not intend to ratify any 
international human rights treaties. Official antipathy to international human rights 
instruments has been entrenched ever since courts have found the provisions of the 
Universal Declaration to be non-binding.”).   
75. See Martin A. Rogoff & Barbara E. Gauditz, The Provisional Application of
International Agreements, 39 ME. L. REV. 29, 33-34 (1987). 
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Each treaty has a corresponding “treaty body”—a body responsible for 
the enforcement and monitoring of that treaty.76  The term enforcement is 
used loosely here, as no human rights treaty body has military authority to 
ensure treaty obligations are carried out.77  Instead, treaty bodies rely on 
international pressure to encourage implementation of, and compliance 
with, international norms found in human rights treaties.78  As a “party”, 
ratifying states must submit reports to the treaty body on their compliance 
with each ratified treaty.79  The treaty body may then issue 
recommendations to the state party on how to maintain or achieve 
compliance.80  Additionally, states are allowed to sign treaties “with 
reservations,” i.e., the state signs the treaty but indicates its own 
interpretation of certain articles or text in the treaty itself.81 Then, if the 
treaty body cites the state for a violation of the treaty,82 the state may 
attempt to point to its reservation as a defense.83 
Some treaty bodies are also judicial. These bodies will hear cases, find 
violations of the treaty, and issue specific recommendations and suggested 
remedies.84  In some configurations, the treaty body itself hears a case.85  In 
other configurations, the treaty body may serve as a commission and decide 
76. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM 23 (2012), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/OHCHR-FactSheet30.pdf [hereinafter 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM].   
77. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing
Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 183-84 (2002) (noting that 
Burma is a perfect example of this, as its human rights abuses have been reported and 
pronounced numerous times, yet the abuse has not stopped).   
78. See id. (“Any hopes for a remedy to human rights violations are generally left
to the sometimes-influential but ultimately unenforceable mechanisms of moral 
persuasion and damning reports.”). 
79. Human RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 24.
80. Id. at 31.
81. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
82. See DONNELLY, supra note 71, at 5.
83. What kind of reservations may be enforced, and the enforceability of
reservations in general, is debatable.  See Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, 
Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT. L. 531, 531-32 (2002).   
84. See generally Human Rights Bodies: Complaint Procedures, OFF. OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014).   
85. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 12, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]. 
 (instructing States parties to hear cases under the Convention on the Right to the 
Child) [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].   
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which cases to pass to a court connected with a treaty or charter.86  In still a 
third configuration, the court is the only body connected with the treaty, 
and thus serves as both commission and court.87  However it happens, 
states are expected to follow the recommendations of the treaty body or 
face international pressure and embarrassment.88  Therefore, international 
human rights “law” is law in a social sense.89  There are no sanctions or 
fines, and the only punishments are shame and perhaps weak retaliation 
carried out by single countries or small groups of nations.90 
Some human rights bodies govern specific geographic regions, such as 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Commission 
for Human and People’s Rights.  These regional bodies, though 
independent of the UN, have similar systems to the one described above, 
and many use and have used the UN treaties and processes as a basis for 
their work and interpretation of human rights.91 
Though sometimes criticized as ineffective,92 the influence of human 
rights law on the way the world conceptualizes “inviolable rights” is 
86. See, e.g., Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights, INTER-AMERICAN
COMM’N ON HUM. RTS.,  http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/Basic1.%20Intro.htm 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (indicating that the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights decides admissibility of cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).  
87. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Otherwise known as the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it is the sole interpreter of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Id. at 246.  
88. Cf. Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century,
35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2006) (“Both Pollyannaish and cynical, the 
international system heavily relies upon the dubious premise that governments will 
faithfully implement international human rights standards within their own domestic 
systems and provide adequate domestic remedies to redress violations . . . Although not 
without exceptions, most international human rights institutions are generally limited to 
monitoring state compliance and promoting adherence to underdeveloped international 
standards through dialogue, condemnation, and moral suasion.”). 
89. Cf. id.
90. See id.
91. See Fekadeselassie F. Kidanemariam, Enforcement of Human Rights Under
Regional Mechanisms:  A Comparative Analysis, 5-6 (Jan. 1, 2006) (unpublished 
L.L.M. thesis, University of Georgia School of Law), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=stu_llm.  
92. Largely, criticism of human rights law is about a lack of enforceability.  See,
e.g., Penelope E. Andrews, Some Middle-Age Spread, A Few Mood Swings, and
Growing Exhaustion: The Human Rights Movement at Middle Age, 41 TULSA L. REV. 
693, 700 (2006) (citing Wojciech Sadurski, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in 
Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 223, 230 (2002)).   
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paramount.93  Though these laws may not always offer protection, they 
offer recognition,94 and this is a great step forward to enforcement.95 
Although some scholars characterize them as merely aspirational,96 UN 
treaties represent the legal floor for standards in international law. 97  Since 
most human rights bodies are based in large part upon these treaties, the 
next section will examine potentially implicated rights under a selected set 
of UN treaties.  This Article will then examine the state of the law as 
interpreted by both UN treaty bodies and regional charters and treaty 
bodies. 
B. Potentially Implicated Rights 
To consider which rights are implicated in embryonic personhood, it is 
first important to consider individual treaties and resolutions, followed by 
how the treaty bodies have interpreted the rights set forth in these treaties. 
This section identifies and analyzes several rights that have either proven to 
be, or may prove to be, implicated when considering personhood from a 
human rights perspective. 
The original conception of modern-day human rights was set out in the 
93. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, 20
HUM. RTS. Q. 201, 233 (1998) (concluding that “human rights have become hegemonic 
and therefore universal by fiat”).   
94. In some cases, not all minorities are explicitly recognized in human rights
documents.  There are large rifts in the human rights field as to whether protections for 
these minorities can be found in existing treaty articles or if new treaties should be 
drafted for each group in need of protection.  See Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities 
Convention:  Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?, 30 
HUM. RTS. Q. 494, 505 (2008).   
95. Cf. Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of
Arctic Melting:  A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental 
Human Rights, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 10 (2007) (discussing how the recognition of 
environmental rights as human rights may lead to greater enforcement).  Though 
environmentalism is a very different topic from IVF, the idea of recognition as helpful 
to enforcement bleeds across into all areas of human rights. 
96. See Eric Engle, Universal Human Rights: A Generational History, 12 ANN.
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 226 (2006). 
97. Cf. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ I.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 
1993). 
 (“The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment of all 
States to fulfil [sic] their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance 
and protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and 
international law. The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond 
question.”). 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in December of 1948.98  
The UDHR itself is not a treaty, but rather a resolution.99  However, on the 
heels of the UDHR many new international treaties and treaty bodies 
formed within the United Nations, and three regional human rights systems 
emerged:  the Inter-American System (including a Commission and a 
Court),100 the African System,101 and the European System.102 
There are nine major international human rights treaties and one major 
resolution.103  Among these, there are a few that are particularly pertinent to 
personhood:  The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),104 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),105 the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),106 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).107 
This article focuses on these particular instruments because of their 
overarching influence (UDHR),108 pertinence to the parties involved (CRC 
and CEDAW)109 and importance to traditional legal arguments about 
98. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 70.
99. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19. Technically, the
UDHR is not a treaty, but rather it is a resolution by the United Nations General 
Assembly.  However, scholars argue that it has become a binding force in international 
law.  See DONNELLY, supra note 70, at 8.  Together with the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, it comprises the International Bill of Human Rights.  Id.  
 100.  The Inter-American System includes a Commission on Human Rights and a 
Court of Human Rights.  See What is the IACHR?, ORG. OF AM. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).   
 101.  The African System includes both the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. 
 102.  The European System once included both a Commission and a Court, but the 
Commission has since been dissolved.  See Council of Europe: European Commission 
on Human Rights, REFWORLD (Feb. 28, 2014, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/COECOMMHR.html.   
 103.  See International Human Rights Law, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM.
RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).   
104.  CRC, supra note 85, at 167. 
105.  UDHR, supra note 19. 
 106.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 107.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 108.  See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 45 (4th ed. 2012) (noting the continuing influence of the UDHR on 
modern constitutional and legislative documents).   
 109.  The CRC is about the rights of the child, and CEDAW is about the rights of 
women.  These are the two parties whose rights would be most involved if personhood 
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reproductive rights (ICCPR).110  Using these human rights instruments as a 
guide, this Article analyzes the potentially implicated rights if embryos are 
granted personhood. 
1. The Right to Life
The right to life is set forth as the basis for all other fundamental
rights.111 Although the original scholarly interpretation of the right to life 
was related to arbitrary deprivation of life in war and violence, human 
rights advocates now understand it to mean that States should take 
measures to prevent unnecessary death.112  Without this right, other rights 
would not exist.113  However, when exactly life begins remains 
controversial.  Those that argue life, in all understandings, begins at 
conception would insist that the right to life starts once an egg is 
fertilized.114  Others argue that although conception may be the biological 
were recognized in the legal arena, and thus these two treaties are of great importance 
in the personhood debate. 
 110.  Many arguments in other areas of the reproductive rights arena rely on civil 
and political rights as a backbone, such as privacy and bodily integrity.  See, e.g., Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining that the “right of privacy . . . is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”); 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C-
355/06, § II (1) (Colom.), available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-355-06.htm (author’s 
translation) (noting that the decision to have a child falls within the privacy sphere); R. 
v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.R. 30, 32-33 (Can.) (noting that the criminalization of
abortion interferes with a woman’s bodily integrity and security of person); K.L. v. 
Peru, Judgment U.N. Human Rights Comm., No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005), available at 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/KL%20HRC%2
0final%20decision.pdf (noting that Peru’s failure to allow K.L. to have an abortion was 
a privacy violation).   
 111.  Right to Life: Understanding Children’s Right to Life, HUMANIUM, 
http://www.humanium.org/en/fundamental-rights/life/ (last visited Apr. 21,2014) 
[hereinafter Right to Life].  This right is featured in the following treaties:  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, supra note 106, at art. 6; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra 
note 84, at 167. 
 112.  Janine Kossen, Rights, Respect, Responsibility: Advancing the Sexual and 
Reproductive Health and Rights of Young People Through International Human Rights 
Law, 15 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 157 (2012).   
113.   Right to Life, supra note 110. 
114.  See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Scientific Fact: Human Life Begins at Conception, or 
Fertilization, LIFENEWS (Nov. 18, 2013, 7:08 PM), 
http://www.lifenews.com/2013/11/18/undisputed-scientific-fact-human-life-begins-at-
conception-or-fertilization/.   
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beginning of life, the social meaning of life begins later.115  “Later” is 
defined in various ways—some define it at eight weeks,116 some at 16-18 
weeks,117 some at viability,118 and others not until a child exits the womb.119  
Depending on a court’s idea of when conception begins, it could either use 
the right to life to uphold or to strike down personhood laws.  However, an 
analysis of pertinent human rights treaties demonstrates that the right to life 
was not meant to apply to embryos. 
a. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 1 of the UDHR begins by stating that, “all human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights.”120  At its adoption, the UN 
representative from France explained that this statement was intended to 
protect rights “from the moment of birth.”121  Since Article 1 prefaces the 
entire document, it seems clear that all subsequent rights are meant to apply 
to persons already born, not to fetuses or embryos.122 
b. Convention on the Rights of the Child
Similarly, the CRC defines a child as “every human being below the age 
 115.  See JOHN HARRIS, ENHANCING EVOLUTION: THE ETHICAL CASE FOR MAKING
BETTER PEOPLE 97 (2010) (“[P]ersons properly so-called are individuals capable of 
valuing their own existence.”); see also Michael V.L. Bennett, Personhood From a 
Neuroscientific Perspective, in ABORTION RIGHTS AND FETAL ‘PERSONHOOD’ (2d ed. 
1990) (arguing that the brain is where personhood begins).   
 116.  John M. Goldenring, The Brain-Life Theory: Towards a Consistent Biological 
Definition of Humanness, 11 J. MED. ETHICS 198, 199 (1985) (advocating a “brain-life” 
theory of when a fetus becomes a person under the law, saying that at eight weeks the 
brain begins to function, thus rendering a mass of cells a “person”).   
 117.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973) (noting that in English common law, 
life was understood to begin at “quickening”, or somewhere around 16-18 weeks).   
 118.  See id. at 159-60, 163 (finding though the Court was not in a position to say 
when life began, they do state that “meaningful life” begins at viability, which is 
commonly understood to be around 24-28 weeks); see also Kevin Glass, Democratic 
Connecticut Senate Candidate: Life Begins at Birth, TOWNHALL (Oct. 19, 2012, 8:43 
PM), 
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/kevinglass/2012/10/19/democrat_connecticut_senate_cand
idate_life_begins_at_birth (noting that “[m]any more Americans believe that fetal life 
begins at viability”). 
 119.  See Glass,C:\Users\Downloads\s supra supra note 117 (relaying that a political 
candidate announced his belief that life begins at birth).   
120.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19. 
 121.  Rhonda Copelon et al., Human Rights Begin at Birth: International Law and 
the Claim of Fetal Rights, 13 REPRO. HEALTH MATTERS 120, 122 (2005) [hereinafter 
Copelon].   
122.  See id. at 121-22. 
19
Paulk: Embyonic Personhood: Implications for Assisted Reproductive Techn
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
800 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 22.4 
of eighteen years.”123 While “human being” is not defined, the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, the CRC’s treaty body, has called upon states to 
include safe abortion services in their provision of reproductive health to 
adolescents,124 which would seem to indicate that embryos are not human 
beings.125 The only provision that can be interpreted as potentially 
clarifying the scope of the right is in the Preamble, which states that 
children should receive legal protection “before as well as after birth.”126  
This language was advanced by the Holy See,127 representatives for the seat 
of the Catholic Hierarchy in the Vatican.  However, the Holy See clarified 
that this amendment “was not to preclude the possibility of an abortion.”128  
Moreover, the amendment was added with the caveat that it was not 
intended to “prejudice the interpretation of Article 1.”129  Clearly, the 
drafters did not want the Preamble’s language to be interpreted as granting 
rights to the unborn.130 
c. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women 
CEDAW’s treaty language is highly sanitized in terms of reproductive 
rights,131 and it never explicitly discusses the right to life.132  However, 
when the CEDAW Committee issues reports, it frames access to safe 
abortion as a right to life issue for pregnant women.133  Since it encourages 
states to facilitate safe abortion due to maternal mortality rates, CEDAW 
123.  CRC, supra note 85, at art. 1. 
124.  Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 122-23.  
 125.  If embryos were human beings, all other CRC rights would apply to them, 
therefore precluding abortion. See id.   
126.  CRC, supra note 85, at Preamble ¶ 9. 
127.  Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 122. 
128.  Id. (citing Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 84, at art. 12). 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. 
 131.  By this I mean that CEDAW as a treaty does not position its discussion of 
abortion in the context of a woman’s right to choose.  Rather, it discusses abortion in 
the context of maternal health, thus making it more palatable to states that refuse to 
recognize that abortion can be an autonomous option.   
 132.  Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 123.  There are provisions however that can 
be read as in support of a woman’s right to choose, such as the right to decide on the 
number and spacing of one’s children.  See Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 105, at art. 16. 
133.  Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 123; see also CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., 
BRINGING RIGHTS TO BEAR 3 (2008), available at 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/BRB_abortion_h
r_revised_3.09_WEB.PDF.   
20
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss4/1
2014] EMBRYONIC PERSONHOOD 801 
prioritizes the life of the mother over the “life” of the embryo or fetus.134  
Thus, if it can be assumed that a treaty would not grant rights to an embryo, 
take them away as a fetus and grant them again to a born child. Therefore, 
CEDAW does not recognize embryonic personhood. 
d. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Many of the provisos of the ICCPR specify the importance of negative 
duties, or protecting individuals from their governments.135  These negative 
duties, however, are understood as existing in conjunction with a 
government’s positive obligation to protect its own citizens.136  Therefore, 
in the context of human rights norms, the right to life is dualistic.  It is 
presumed to be a principle violated by undue governmental intrusion where 
the government is also expected to take positive steps to protect the right to 
life. 
Both the drafters and the current treaty body of the ICCPR have refused 
to codify the existence of a prenatal right to life.137  The drafters of the 
ICCPR explicitly rejected a proposal saying: “the right to life is inherent in 
the human person from the moment of conception, [and] this right shall be 
protected by law.”138  The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the ICCPR’s 
treaty body, has since made numerous pronouncements in favor of 
liberalizing abortion laws, noting that clandestine abortions are a risk to a 
pregnant woman’s right to life.139 
134.  Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 123. 
 135.  This is in contrast to social and economic rights, which are more about positive 
duties, or minimum standards of needs the government must provide for its citizens. 
See Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 
1764-65 (2008).   
 136.  Id. at 1765 (discussing the fact that the UDHR contains both positive and 
negative rights, which shows that originally the international community understood 
them to exist together, despite the bifurcation in the treaty system caused by the Cold 
War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union).   
 137.  See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., RIGHTS AT RISK:  THE TRUTH ABOUT PRENATAL
PERSONHOOD 15-16 (2012), available at 
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/default/files/crr_personhoodpapers_briefingpaper.pdf
. 
 138.  Id. at 15 (quoting U.N. GAOR Annex, 12th Sess., Agenda item 33, at 96, U.N. 
Doc. A/C.3/L.654 (1957); U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Agenda Item 33, at 113, U.N. Doc. 
A/3764 (1957)).   
 139.  Id. at 15 (citing United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 
28, Article 3 (Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, Concluding Observations: Colombia, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/COL/CO/6 
(August 4, 2010); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports 
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For example, the HRC decided its first abortion case in 2005, K.L. v. 
Peru.140  In that case, the HRC ruled that Peru’s failure to allow an abortion 
for a minor unduly interfered with her right to privacy under Article 17 of 
the ICCPR.141  Moreover, the Committee members reiterated that 
“restrictive provisions on abortion” subject women to “inhumane 
treatment” and that criminalization of abortion is prohibited under Articles 
3, 6 (the right to life), and 7 of the ICCPR.142  The state’s refusal to allow 
an abortion left K.L. with two risky options:  seeking a clandestine abortion 
or carrying a dangerous pregnancy to term.143  In this case, the dualistic 
right to life required Peru to stop interfering in K.L.’s ability to get an 
abortion, and to thus protect her from the harm that either a clandestine 
abortion or a dangerous pregnancy would bring.  The HRC’s 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding 
Observations: El Salvador, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SLV/CO/6 (November 18, 2010); 
United Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations: Poland, ¶ 8, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/CO/82/POL (Dec. 2, 2004); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, Concluding Observations: Argentina, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ARG/CO/4 
(March 31, 2010); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding 
Observations: Ireland, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3 (July 30, 2008); United 
Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of this Covenant, Concluding Observations: Mexico, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (May 17, 2010); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, Concluding Observations: Monaco, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C?MCO/CO/2 
(Dec. 12, 2008); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding 
Observations: Nicaragua, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3 (Dec. 12, 2008); United 
Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations: Panama, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3 (Apr. 17, 2008)). 
 140.  K.L. v. Peru, Judgment U.N. Human Rights Comm., No. 1153/2003, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005), available at 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/KL%20HRC%2
0final%20decision.pdf.   
 141.  Among other violations.  See id. at ¶ 6.4. In this case, the minor was carrying 
an anencephalic fetus, which risks danger to the life of the mother and the fetus if 
carried to term.  Both the minor and the fetus had severe health complications, and the 
child’s death four days after birth caused K.L. to go into a deep depression.   
142.  Id. at ¶ 3.5. 
 143.  Id. at ¶ 3.3.  In addition to a violation of privacy, the HRC ruled Peru’s actions 
were a violation of the right to an effective remedy due to discriminatory treatment 
based on sex, id. at ¶ 6.6, the right to protection of minors, id. at ¶ 6.5, and the right not 
to be subjected to torture, cruel, or inhuman punishment.  Id. at ¶ 6.3.   
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acknowledgement that restrictive abortion provisions violate the right to 
life further demonstrates that the ICCPR’s right to life provision is not 
meant to apply to embryos. 
2. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has been used in international law to both uphold
and restrict regulations related to embryonic personhood.144  The right to 
privacy is defined as the right to be free from “arbitrary interference” by 
the government.145  A typical caveat is that the government is justified in 
some privacy interference when it is related to matters of public import, 
such as national security, public health, or public morals.146 
In jurisprudence concerning medical matters, the right to privacy is 
sometimes cited to prevent arbitrary governmental interference with 
choices about health.  For example, in states that recognize health care as a 
privacy right, a woman seeking an abortion cannot be arbitrarily denied 
that abortion by the state, as this would be an interference with her private 
health care choices.147  By the same logic, denying a couple or single 
person the right to freeze leftover eggs would also be an interference with 
private healthcare choices.148  Moreover, since infertility can and has been 
conceptualized as a health problem,149 a doctor’s recommendation 
 144.  See id. at ¶ 6.4; see also, Evans v. United Kingdom., 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, ¶ 69-
70 (2006).   
145.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note  19, at art. 12. 
 146.  See Robert A. Ermanski, The Right to Privacy for Gay People Under 
International Human Rights Law, 15 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 141, 148 (1992) 
(noting that the right to privacy is subject to lawful limitations); see, e.g., USA Patriot 
Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012) (allowing a certain level of invasion of privacy 
under the justification of national security); Rebecca F. Wisch, Table of State Animal 
Sexual Assault Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/State%20Tables/tbusanimalassault.htm (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2014) (explaining that bestiality laws are largely justified under judicial 
conceptions of public morality).   
 147.  As this could also be characterized as government interference with a private 
choice about fertility, a health-related matter.  See supra Part III(A)(4) (discussing K.L. 
v. Peru).
148.  See Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and
Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 98 (2010) 
(“[T]he ability to control one’s fertility is a health issue.”).  
 149.  See Françoise Shenfield et al., European Society of Human Reproduction and 
Embryology Task Force on Ethics and Law, Gamete and Embryo Donation, 17 HUM.
REPROD. 1407, 1407 (2002).  The World Health Organization has similarly classified 
infertility as a disease and a disability.  See Infertility Definition and Terminology, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/infertility/definitions/en/index.html (last 
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regarding infertility treatments, including IVF and egg-freezing, should be 
treated similarly to other health problems.  That is, the patient’s choice 
should be respected as a decision protected under the right to privacy.150 
The question of how human rights bodies have treated the right to 
privacy is a difficult one to answer.151  Although the right to privacy is 
found in several human rights documents,152 its scope is unclear.  The right 
to privacy, perhaps more so than other rights, has been applied in a wide 
variety of situations.153  Human rights scholar James Griffin identifies three 
conceptions of this right: privacy of information, privacy of space and life, 
and privacy of liberty.154  Within these spheres, there are also further 
divisions.155  Therefore, conceptually, the right to privacy can apply in 
many areas of life and law.  However, since there is little guidance to be 
found in the treaties – and the cases are varied – the best way to currently 
assess the scope of privacy law is to examine specific cases that can be 
used as models for how the right to privacy could apply to embryonic 
personhood. 
Specifically, many cases that address reproductive rights in general use 
the privacy right as all or part of the legal argument in favor of access to 
those rights.  For example, in K.L. v. Peru,156 Roe v. Wade,157 and C-355/
06,158 the privacy right is used to justify the right to access an abortion.  In 
visited Apr. 21, 2014).  It is unclear, as of yet, if social or elective infertility will be 
included in this definition, which is largely medical in nature. 
150.  See Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, ¶ 71 (2006). 
151.  See Ermanski, supra note 145, at 148. 
 152.  See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 47 (2009), available at 
http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/PractitionersGuideonSOGI.pdf [hereinafter INT’L 
COMM’N OF JURISTS].  
153.  INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 151, at 48-49. 
154.  JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 234 (2008). 
155.  Id. at 234. 
 156.  K.L. v. Peru, Human Rights Comm., No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005) available at 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/KL%20HRC%2
0final%20decision.pdf (noting that Peru’s failure to allow K.L. to have an abortion was 
a privacy violation).   
 157.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy. . .is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
158.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia 
C-355/06, § II (1) (Colom.), available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-355-06.htm (author’s 
translation) (last visited Apr. 20, 2014) (noting that the decision to have a child falls 
within the privacy sphere). 
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Evans v. U.K., the court concludes that a law on parental consent to the 
destruction of embryos does not violate the privacy right, affirming the 
balancing of competing societal and private interests.159  In Artavia Murillo 
y otros (“Fecundación in vitro”) vs. Costa Rica, the court declares a ban on 
IVF to be a privacy violation in part due to the fact that a ban does not 
allow couples to have autonomy in their personal decisions concerning 
childbearing.160  Artavia Murillo and Evans have other implications as well, 
and are discussed in full below.161  Thus, the privacy right has largely been 
interpreted to support situations that are at odds with embryonic 
personhood, such as IVF and abortion.  As such, embryonic personhood is 
not a concept recognized under the right to privacy. 
3. The Right to Found a Family
Both the UDHR and the ICCPR contain the “right to marry and found a
family.”162  The right to found a family is not explicitly clarified in human 
rights law.  However, as the IACHR recently used this right to declare the 
Costa Rican ban on IVF a violation of human rights in Artavia Murillo, its 
relevance for embryonic personhood is clear.163 
Some commentators argue that the right to found a family is 
encompassed in a general “right to procreate,” which is tied to the broader 
body of reproductive rights.164  However, there is a split regarding the 
right’s breadth.  Some see it as an unfettered general right to make all 
related childbearing decisions.165  This is based in part on the sweeping 
 159.  See Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, ¶ 92 (2006); see also 
Richard F. Storrow, The Proportionality Problem in Cross-Border Reproductive Care, 
in THE GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH CARE 125, 125-47 (I. Glenn Cohen ed., 2013) 
(noting the breadth of appreciation argument).   
 160.  Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶¶ 281, 285, 317 (Nov. 28, 2012).  The court also says that 
the right to privacy is violated when governments place obstacles around the ways a 
woman chooses to control her fertility, including the decision to become a genetic 
parent.  See id. at ¶ 39.  Further, the court notes that, in the IVF context, the rights to 
private life and reproductive freedom become the right to access the medical 
technology needed to exercise those rights, and therefore the reach of the privacy right, 
reproductive autonomy, and the right to found a family extend to the right to benefit 
from the progress of science and the right to access reproductive technologies, like 
IVF.  See id. at ¶ 31. 
161.  See infra § IV(A) & (B)(1). 
 162.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19, at art. 16; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 106, at art. 23(2). 
 163.  See Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 at ¶ 150, 317; see 
also infra Part IV(B) (discussing the implications of the case).   
164.  See Dillard, supra note 31, at 27-28. 
165.  Reed Boland, Civil and Political Rights and the Right to Nondiscrimination: 
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generalization of the right in some documents, and in part on human rights 
law’s broad deference to individuals, rather than states, in matters such as 
abortion.166 
For instance, CEDAW states that men and women have equal “rights to 
decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children, and 
to have access to the information, education, and means to enable them to 
exercise these rights.”167  The interpretation of any right as unfettered is, of 
course, unrealistic, considering that all rights are subject to limitations by 
other rights.  However, embryonic personhood implicates the right to found 
a family because it could preclude infertile couples, single individuals, or 
same-sex couples from pursuing fertility treatments,168 which would limit 
their right to become biological parents.  According to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the right to become biological parents is 
inherent in the right to found a family.169 
4. The Right to Non-Discrimination
Finally, in a creative application of human rights law, the right to non-
discrimination potentially protects the legality of IVF.  If a state denies a 
right, such as the right to found a family, based on a couple or single 
person’s infertility170 or same-sex status,171 for instance, it may be violating 
Population Policies, Human Rights, and Legal Change, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1263 
(1995) (arguing that the ICCPR “implies the right to make fully voluntary decisions 
about childbearing”). 
 166.  See generally Human Rights: Supporting the Constellation of Reproductive 
Rights, U. N. POPULATION FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/rights/rights.htm (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2014).   
 167.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, supra note 105.  
 168.  See supra Part II for a discussion of how personhood could affect IVF, thereby 
affecting those who need access to IVF in order to become genetic or gestational 
parents. See also Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 12.361 at ¶¶ 85-125 
(detailing the heartache of infertile couples caused by infertility coupled with a ban on 
IVF treatments). 
 169.  See Martin Hevia & Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, The Legal Status of In Vitro 
Fertilization in Latin America and the American Convention on Human Rights, 36 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 51, 71 (2013) (quoting Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, 
Case 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 85/10, ¶ 80 (2010), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.361Eng.pdf). 
 170.  See Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 126 (Nov. 28, 2012). Representative Molina of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is quoted in the decision as saying that 
infertility qualifies as a disability, and that the infertile couples in this case were 
discriminated against for their infertility-disability. Id. The Court does not affirm this 
statement, but merely acknowledges that it was made.  Id. 
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the non-discrimination principle.  The right to non-discrimination includes 
some enumerated categories (e.g., race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin) as well as the category 
of “other status,” which can and has been used by human rights bodies to 
protect all manner of statuses.172  However, the UN is clear that this right 
does not prohibit all distinctions.173  Rather, the prohibition is on 
unreasonable, non-legitimate distinctions.174  For example, distinctions that 
are made to remedy discrimination are permissible, whereas distinctions 
that prohibit people from enjoying their rights “on equal footing” with 
others are impermissible.175  If this right were to be invoked in the face of 
embryonic personhood classifications, the questions for human rights 
bodies would be: 1) whether fertility is a legitimate distinction for 
discrimination purposes,176 2) whether a ban on IVF discriminates against 
 171.  This is similar to an argument made by the Malta Gay Rights Movement in 
response to the Embryo Protection Act, a law made by the Maltese government that 
excludes same-sex couples and singles from a definition of “prospective parent”. 
Though the Malta Gay Rights Movements objected on the grounds of the human right 
to found a family, this means that lack of access to IVF could be seen as discriminatory 
against those who – like same-sex couples – may need IVF technology in order to 
realize the right to found a family.  See Embryo Protection Act (2013) Cap. 524, (2013) 
Cap., available at 
http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=11960&l=1; 
see also Matthew Xuereb, Bishop: IVF Law Is ‘Not Homophobic,’ TIMES OF MALTA 
(Sept. 17, 2013 12:01AM), 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20130917/local/Bishop-IVF-law-is-not-
homophobic-.486481#.UtAcf2RDvVs.  It is unclear as to whether the right could be 
extended to single people or those pursuing elective fertility, depending on whether 
these pursuits can be classified under non-discrimination theory.   
 172.  See Sophie M. Clavier, Objection Overruled: The Binding Nature of the 
International Norm Prohibiting Discrimination Against Homosexual and 
Transgendered Individuals, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 385, 390-93 (2012).   
 173.  OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISS’R FOR HUM. RTS., The Right to Equality and Non-
Discrimination in the Administration of Justice, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAWYERS
651 (2003), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter13en.pdf. 
174.  Id.  
175.  See id. at 660. 
 176.  This question has been invoked before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in the Artavia Murillo case, but the discrimination was premised on the 
basis that infertility is a disability, and thus that a ban on IVF was discriminatory 
against people with infertility-disabilities.  The discrimination issue was not addressed 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (binding) follow-up decision.  See 
Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 138 (Nov. 28, 2012).  (quoting in dicta Representative Molina of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as saying that infertility qualifies as a 
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same-sex couples,177 and 3) whether that discrimination extends to other 
social or elective forms of fertility – and the limitations therein.178 
5. Reproductive Rights
Although they are not made explicit in any human rights treaty, the
appellation “reproductive rights” is used as an umbrella term to capture a 
variety of experiences people have related to reproduction, including, but 
not limited to, contraception, access to safe abortion, and freedom from 
forced abortions.179  In the absence of an explicit pronouncement declaring 
IVF to be encompassed under an existing human right, it can and should be 
included where treaty bodies issue reports and makes recommendations on 
“reproductive rights.”  By recognizing IVF under this umbrella term, states 
would be discouraged from banning or over-regulating the procedure under 
international human rights law.180 
IV. STATE OF THE LAW
The majority of cases analyzed below concern fetal personhood, as most 
human rights bodies have not explicitly addressed embryonic 
personhood.181  However, operating under the assumption that a court’s 
rejection of fetal personhood reasonably implies that it would also reject 
disability, and that the infertile couples in this case were discriminated against for their 
infertility-disability). 
 177.  Because same-sex couples use IVF in order to become genetic parents to a 
child, this is one ground on which discrimination could be invoked, saying that a ban 
on IVF is discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or “other status.”  
 178.  I assume courts would articulate limitations surrounding, at least, elective 
forms of fertility where the denial of IVF or resources to access the same is based on a 
wish to delay parenthood that is unconnected to a medical condition.  It is much harder 
to articulate a theory of discrimination when one uses IVF only because one is not 
ready to parent until a later age, though there may be case-by-case exceptions.  There 
are also compelling arguments to the contrary.  See, e.g., Imogen Goold & Julian 
Savulescu, In Favour of Freezing Eggs for Non-Medical Reasons, 23 BIOETHICS 47, 
47-58 (2009). 
 179.  See generally Human Rights: Supporting the Constellation of Reproductive 
Rights, supra note 165. 
 180.  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, has ruled that IVF 
relates specifically to reproductive rights, and that the right to found a family includes 
the right to access the necessary reproductive technologies (like IVF) to do so.  See, 
e.g., Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 ¶¶ 144, 150.  Hopefully this
would also encourage some modicum of regulation, since although over-regulation can 
be tantamount to deprivation in some cases, some regulation is important to ensure 
safety and ethical medical practices.   
 181.  There are currently no overarching Asian human rights bodies, nor are there 
human rights bodies in Oceania, so the analysis here is limited to existing bodies. 
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embryonic personhood; this section will attempt to synthesize the state of 
international law around the rights of embryos. 
A. Europe and the European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 182 has implicitly denied 
fetal personhood on four occasions.  In Paton v. U.K., the Court ruled that 
the word “everyone” in Article 2 of the European Convention (the 
governing document of the Court183) does not include fetuses.184  In both 
R.H. v. Norway and Boso v. Italy, the Court held that a fetal right to life did 
not outweigh the interests of the pregnant woman, again affirming that the 
use of the word “everyone” in Article 2 does not include fetuses.185  In Vo 
v. France, the Court again declined to rule explicitly that Article 2 includes
fetuses, but was also particularly evasive regarding whether Article 2 could 
potentially be interpreted that way.186 
Most conclusive on the issue of embryonic personhood is the more 
recent case of Evans v. U.K.187  In Evans, a couple wanted to use IVF to 
have a child.188  The couple separated before IVF treatments began, but 
after the embryos had been fertilized.189  After the separation, the husband 
wrote to the clinic where the embryos were stored, asking for them to be 
destroyed, thereby effectively withdrawing his consent for their continued 
storage.190  Under English law, the consent of both potential parents is 
required for continued storage of embryos.191  Thus, the wife sued to 
 182.  The European Court of Human Rights is now the main adjudicatory body in 
the European Human Rights System.  Previously, there was also a European 
Commission on Human Rights, which disbanded in 1998.  The Commission mainly 
served a gatekeeping function for the Court.  See Storrow, supra note 158, at 133 
(citing MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 4 (2007)).   
183.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. 
 184.  Paton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8416/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408, 413 
(1981).   
 185.  RH v. Norway, App. No. 17004/90, 73 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155 




 186.  See Tanya Goldman, Vo. v. France and Human Rights: The Decision Not to 
Decide, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 277, 278-79 (2005). 
187.  Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2006). 
188.  Id. at  ¶¶ 13-15. 
189.  Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. 
190.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
191.  Id. at ¶ 15.   
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restore her husband’s consent to the storage.192  After failing to win support 
under English law, the wife sued in the ECHR, arguing that the English law 
violated three articles of the European Convention.193  The wife argued that 
the English law violated the embryo’s right to life under Article 2, her right 
to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and her right to non-
discrimination under Article 14.194  The ECHR ruled in favor of the 
husband on all counts.195 
As for the embryo’s right to life, the Court ruled that “the issue of when 
the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation. . .under 
English law. . .[and] an embryo does not have independent rights or 
interests and cannot claim. . .a right to life under Article 2.”196  Therefore, 
the ECHR has pronounced that the embryo lacks personhood under English 
law, but that the margin of appreciation197 allows for other member states to 
decide differently. 
Moreover, the ECHR concluded that it is not a violation of privacy, or a 
discriminatory measure, to require dual spousal consent for embryonic 
storage.198  This measure is justified by balancing respect for the wife’s 
desire to become a parent with the husband’s desire not to become a parent 
such that one does not outweigh the other.199  This ruling was made in the 
context of the Court’s broad deference to the United Kingdom due to the 
lack of consensus among member states of the ECHR on the embryonic 
storage consent issue.200  The Court further justified this ruling by noting 
that it felt the United Kingdom was balancing the competing societal 
interests (in medical consent) with private interests.201  This interpretation 
of what Evans means for embryonic personhood was arguably affirmed by 
192.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
193.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. at ¶¶ 56, 92, 96. 
196.  Id. at ¶ 54. 
 197.  The “margin of appreciation” is a concept in the ECHR whereby the Court 
gives latitude to member states on certain issues that are not universally held in the 
European system based on national interests or moral relativism.  See Eyal Benvenisti, 
Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 843, 843 (1999).  This system threatens to undermine the universality of human 
rights jurisprudence as a whole.  Id. at 844. 
198.  Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 68-70 (2006). 
 199.  Natasha Hammond, Case Commentary: Evans v. The United Kingdom, in 
ETHICS, LAW AND SOCIETY 363, 364-65 (Jennifer Gunning & Søren Holm ed., 2013). 
200.  Id. at 364. 
 201.  See Evans, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 82; see also Storrow, supra note 64, at 298-99 
(noting the breadth of appreciation argument).   
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implication in the cases of S.H. v. Austria202 and Costa and Pavan vs. 
Italy.203  Both of these cases concerned the regulation of IVF, and the fact 
that neither case included a discussion of embryonic rights or embryonic 
life, supports the conclusion that embryos are not legal persons.204 
In sum, embryonic personhood is not recognized under human rights law 
in the ECHR.  However, this does not preclude other challenges that may 
affect access to IVF, such as challenges over how IVF is regulated.  This is 
particularly true if challengers use Evans as precedent to successfully argue 
that larger societal interests, such as public health or welfare, are at stake in 
the use of procedures such as IVF.205 
B. American States and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
The Inter-American Human Rights System is arguably more complicated 
than other governing human rights bodies.  The main adjudicatory and 
quasi-adjudicatory bodies are the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (collectively 
IACHR).206  The IACHR is governed by two documents: the American 
Convention on Human Rights (AC) and the American Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man (Declaration).207  The AC is the most up-to-date 
human rights treaty in effect for the Organization of American States, the 
oldest regional organization in the world.208  Some countries—like the 
 202.  S.H. v. Austria, Judgment, App. No. 57813/00, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. (Mar. 11, 
2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-309.   
 203.  Costa v. Italy, App. No. 54270/10, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. Eur. (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-112993. 
 204.  See Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 242 (Nov. 28, 2012).  It is also possible that the Court 
did not want to reach this issue, and that is why they ignored it.  But I think this 
unlikely given the moral status that embryonic personhood proponents often attach to 
embryos.  If a majority of members of the Court felt that embryos were persons under 
the law, embryonic life and/or rights would have been at least touched upon. 
205.  This has already happened, in fact, although personhood did not come up.  See, 
e.g., Costa, App. No. 54270/10 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 38-40; S.H., App. No. 57813/00, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 
 206.  See Ligia M. De Jesus, Revisiting Baby Boy v. United States: Why the IACHR 
Resolution Did Not Effectively Undermine the Inter-American System on Human 
Rights’ Protection of the Right to Life from Conception, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 221, 224-25 
(2011).   
 207.  See Sources of the Mandate, ORG. OF AM. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/sources.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).  Much of 
the Declaration’s text is also included in the AC.  Id. 
 208.  See Who We Are, ORG. OF AM. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
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United States—are members of the Organization for American States, but 
have not yet ratified the AC.209  Therefore, the default governing document 
binding on the United States is the Declaration.210  Though the IACHR uses 
the AC as the main legally governing document, the Declaration is still 
considered binding on all member states.211 
Therefore, when a potentially viable fetus was aborted in Massachusetts 
but courts refused to charge the doctor with manslaughter; two pro-life 
activists used the Declaration as a basis to bring the case of Baby Boy v. 
United States212 before the Inter-American Commission.213  The petitioners 
argued that Article 4(1) of the Declaration, protecting the right to life “in 
general” applied here, under the premise that the United States’ refusal to 
prosecute the doctor was a violation of their binding commitment to uphold 
the Declaration.  The United States, and ultimately the Inter-American 
Commission, argued that a combination of current state practice and 
historical drafting notes meant the words “in general” were intended to 
allow states to permit abortion.214 
This interpretation is arguably incorrect.215  As both advocates and critics 
of the ruling note: it is not exactly clear why the Inter-American 
Commission elected to decide the case in this manner.216  However, there 
209.  See De Jesus, supra note 206, at 231. 
 210.  This is the oldest human rights treaty in existence, ratified just one year before 
the UDHR, together with the Organization of American States’ Charter.  See Elizabeth 
Strenio, The Inter-American Human Rights System, HUM. RTS. EDUC. ASSOC., 
http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=413 (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
 211.  See Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 10, ¶ 12 (July 14, 
1989), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4j.htm; Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, INTER-AM.
COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic1.%20Intro.htm 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014).  The United States contests the assertion that the 
Declaration is binding law.   
 212.  Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶ 1-2 (1981), available at 
http:/www.cidh.org/annualrep/80.81eng/USA2141.htm.   
213.  See De Jesus, supra note 206, at 226-27. 
214.  Id. at 233. 
215.  Id. at 258-262. 
 216.  Id. at 263 (quoting Dinah Shelton, International Law on Protection of the 
Fetus, in ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN FETUS: LEGAL PROBLEMS IN A 
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 (Stanislaw J. Frankowski & George F. Cole eds., 
1987) (noting the critiques that the Commission used “questionable reasoning, faulty 
analysis, and little or no attention [was] paid to the usual canons of construction of 
international documents”).   
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are a fair number of countries in the Americas that continue to ban abortion 
outright, with no exceptions.217  Some countries in the Americas 
outspokenly interpret Article 4(1) of the convention to apply to life “from 
conception,”218 which indicates their belief that fertilized embryos are 
covered under Article 4(1).219  As noted earlier, the codification of the 
notion that life begins at conception would make the embryo a legal person, 
which is likely in direct conflict with the UDHR.  Although the UDHR 
does not govern the IACHR system specifically, it has persuasive authority 
and relevancy to all human rights bodies as it is conceptualized as an 
overarching human rights standard.220 
However, in November 2012, the IACHR reaffirmed Baby Boy’s holding 
in the Artavia Murillo case.221  In the decision, the Court conducts a 
thorough analysis of the right to life and finds there is no precedent for 
embryonic personhood in either the Inter-American System or the 
International Human Rights system.222  The Court further undertakes a 
comparative law analysis to the same end:  the broad practice of IVF 
implies that other countries have interpreted governing human rights 
treaties as permissive of IVF and thus as contrary to the recognition of 
 217.  See World Abortion Laws Map, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS.,  
http://worldabortionlaws.com/map/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (including El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Suriname and Chile). 
 218.  See De Jesus, supra note 206, at 265-66.  De Jesus argues that a historical 
analysis of the travaux préparatoires and various committees on interpretation of the 
Declaration, along with the ordinary meaning “in light of its object and purpose” shows 
that Article 4(1) is meant to protect both the “human embryo and human fetus’ right to 
life from abortion, from the time of fertilization until birth.” Id. at 264.  Clearly De 
Jesus’ interpretation would hold that fertilized embryos, whether implanted or not, are 
protected under the Declaration. 
 219.  Id. at 265-66.  This includes Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the 
Dominican Republic.  The IACHR has not explicitly endorsed the doctrine of margin 
of appreciation as used in the ECHR, but it made reference to it in one case.  See Eyal 
Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 843, 844 n.5 (1999) (citing Proposed Amendments to the 
Naturalizations Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-
4184, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4 (Jan. 19, 1984), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/iachr.html) (approving 
“the margin of appreciation which is reserved to States when it comes to the 
establishment of requirements for the acquisition of nationality and the determination 
whether they have been complied with”).  
220.  See Kidanemariam, supra note 90, at 5-6.  
 221.  See Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶¶ 220-21 (Nov. 28, 2012).   
 222.  Id. ¶ 244 (analyzing according to the Declaration, the AC, the UDHR, the 
ICCPR, and the CRC).   
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embryos as persons under the law.223 
As there is at least one country in the Americas that is in defiance of the 
decision in Artavia Murillo, the next section examines country-specific 
laws in an attempt to understand how the region treats IVF and therefore 
embryonic personhood.  The next section also explores how some 
countries’ treatment of IVF has changed or will change in the wake of the 
Artavia Murillo case. 
1. Country Studies in the Americas
At least one country, Costa Rica, has made an explicit pronouncement on
the application of the right to life standard to pre-implantation embryos. 
Costa Rica currently does not allow IVF procedures because their 
Constitutional Court in 2000 declared that the procedure violates the right 
to life under Article 4(1) of the Declaration.224  Though the Constitutional 
Court held that IVF violates the right to life because embryos are people 
with legal protections,225 Costa Rica still allows abortion in limited cases 
where the mother’s life or health is threatened.226  However, in the Artavia 
Murillo case, the IACHR declared that Costa Rica’s ban on IVF is in 
violation of the right to personal integrity, the right to personal liberty, the 
right to private and family life, and the right to marry and raise a family.227  
As of this writing, Costa Rica has not yet complied with the ultimate ruling 
in Artavia Murillo which requires it to pass a law regulating and allowing 
IVF.228  In December 2013, the Costa Rican Congress was poised to vote 
223.  Id. ¶¶ 247-256. 
 224.  Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala. Const. marzo 15, 2002, Sentencia No. 2306-
00 (Costa Rica).   
225.  See generally Judgment No. 2000–002306, Supreme Court of Justice of Costa 
Rica (March 15, 2000), available at http://sitios.poder-
judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/Centro%20de%20Jurisprudencia/normas_declaradas_i
nconstitucion.htm#2000 (summarizing judgments of the Court); see also Fernando 
Zegers-Hochschild et al., Human Rights to In Vitro Fertilization, 123 INT’L J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 86, 87 (2013). 
 226.  See Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., Despite Country’s Own Laws, Costa 
Rica Continues to Deny Women Legal Abortion (Aug. 23, 2013), available at 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/despite-country%E2%80%99s-own-laws-
costa-rica-continues-to-deny-women-legal-abortion; see also World Abortion Laws 
Map, supra note 217. This also contradicts my earlier argument that states who grant 
rights to embryos are less likely to then not grant those same rights to fetuses, and vice 
versa. However, recent reports show that perhaps Costa Rica is not actually allowing 
access to abortion in practice. Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., supra note 226. 
227.  See Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 ¶ 317. 
228.  See Alvaro Murillo, Un Año Sin Cumplir una Sentencia Sobre Fecundación 
“In Vitro,” EL PAÍS (Dec. 20, 2013, 6:18PM), 
http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2013/12/20/actualidad/1387560697_741825.html. 
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on a law concerning the regulation of IVF.229  However, 12 members broke 
the quorum, further delaying the vote and leaving Costa Rica without a law 
regulating IVF.230  As a result, it is still currently illegal to pursue treatment 
for IVF within Costa Rica.231 
The rest of the countries in the Americas either openly allow or regulate 
IVF, some at the national level, and many at more local levels.232  
However, there is controversy within some countries due to inside actors 
agitating for embryonic personhood.  The most illustrative cases of this are 
Argentina and the United States.  In Argentina in 1999, a Buenos Aires 
Court declared that personhood begins at conception, but local ART centers 
refused to comply with or enforce the law, which included revealing the 
number and parentage of all embryos in all Buenos Aires ART clinics.233  
The clinics agreed among themselves not to take further action.234  When a 
fine was later imposed, the clinics appealed the decision, citing patient 
privacy rights and the preservation of patient-physician privilege.235 
Subsequently in 2004, a Buenos Aires judge appointed a Catholic lawyer 
to be the legal guardian of all the cryopreserved embryos in ten Buenos 
Aires ART centers.236  The lawyer, Ricardo Rabinovich-Berkman, 
believing that embryos are abandoned children, had been petitioning the 
Buenos Aires courts since 1993 to protect the human rights of ART-created 
embryos and fertilized eggs.237  However, through “a united refusal to 
cooperate,” the ART centers in Buenos Aires rendered the rulings 
ineffectual, and Rabinovich eventually stepped down as guardian of the 
embryos.238  Therefore, although Buenos Aires courts ruled in 1999 that 
229.  Id.  
230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. However, Costa Rica has complied with the ancillary measures in the 
court’s order, such as paying out compensation to the couples who originally brought 
the suit and providing them with free psychological care.  See Patricia Recio, 23 
Parejas han Presentado Demandas Contra el Estado para No Permitir la FIV, LA 
NACIÓN (Aug. 22, 2013, 5:21 PM), http://www.nacion.com/nacional/salud-
publica/parejas-presentado-demandas-permitir-FIV_0_1361463958.html.   
 232.  See Kelly Amanda Raspberry, Conflicted Conceptions:  An Ethnography of 
Assisted Reproduction Practices in Argentina 178-79 (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at 
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/content?id=uuid:748d6f41-9c8c-41d4-9246-
214552fe888c&ds=DATA_FILE.   
233.  Id. at 288-89.  
234.  Id.   
235.  Id.   
236.  Id. at 287. 
237.  Id.   
238.  Id. at 288, 292.  
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life begins at conception, the ruling was never in force due to refusal by 
local centers to cooperate.239  The law has since been considerably 
liberalized.  In 2010, the Buenos Aires provincial government passed Law 
14.208, which guaranteed coverage of IVF procedures under the public 
health system for certain populations.240 
Moreover, the Argentinean Supreme Court issued a clarifying ruling in 
March, 2012, declaring that abortion is permitted in cases of rape, while 
also noting that abortion was already allowed where the life or health of the 
mother is threatened.241  Argentina has also recently issued a direct 
regulation of IVF at the national level, declaring that IVF treatments will be 
free for all adults seeking to become parents.242  Although it is unclear what 
direct relationship this has, if any, with the Artavia Murillo ruling, 
Argentina is leading the way when it comes to what some have deemed 
“the right to fertility.”243 
In the United States, regulation is lacking and federal and state laws have 
made multifarious pronouncements in the area.  For example, in the case of 
Davis v. Davis,244 a Tennessee court declared that a pre-embryo is accorded 
respect – but is not a person.245  This is similar to a line of thinking about 
embryos called the “Third Way,” as articulated by Lawrence J. Nelson and 
Michael J. Meyer, whereby embryos, though not persons, are accorded 
special respect because of their potential for human life.246 
239. Id. at 288 
 240.  Law No. 14.208, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Dec. 2, 2010, B.O. 26507(Arg.); 
see also Decreto No. 2980/10, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Jan. 4, 2011, B.O. 26507 
(Arg.).  The law recognizes infertility as a disease as per criteria handed down by the 
World Health Organization. See Martin Hevia & Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, The Legal 
Status of In Vitro Fertilization in Latin America and the American Convention on 
Human Rights, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 51, 61 n.31 (2013). Hevia and 
Vacaflor also state that the specific regulation is limited to women ages 30-40. Id.   
 241.  See Jennifer Gurevich, Argentina Decriminalizes Abortion in Cases of Rape, 
CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-
room/argentina-decriminalizes-abortion-in-all-cases-of-rape (explaining that the law 
was previously unclear in this area; however, Argentina did allow abortions in the case 
of a rape of a mentally disabled person).  Argentina also allows abortion when the life 
or health of the mother is threatened.  Id.   
242.  See Veronica Smink, Argentina, Pionero en el Derecho a la Fertilidad, BBC
MUNDO (June 14, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2013/06/130610_argentina_fertilidad_vs.shtml. 
243.  Id. 
244.  Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596-97 (Tenn. 1992). 
245.  Id. at 596-97. 
 246.  See Lawrence J. Nelson & Michael J. Meyer, Confronting Deep Moral 
Disagreement:  The President’s Council on Bioethics, Moral Status, and Human 
Embryos, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 33, 33 (2005).   
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In contrast to Tennessee, several states have advanced or are planning to 
advance legislation granting personhood at conception.247  Because of 
federal law governing abortion, state personhood legislation creates 
questions of federalism regarding which governmental entity is allowed to 
define life’s beginning.  Since the federal government requires a hands-off 
approach to abortion until up to 12 weeks of pregnancy (but allows states to 
regulate abortion after twelve weeks and until viability248), allowing states 
to define the beginning of life at conception has the potential to contravene 
a woman’s ability to choose an abortion.249  Supreme Court precedent 
declares that laws creating a substantial obstacle to a woman’s decision to 
have an abortion before viability constitute an undue burden and are 
therefore unconstitutional.250  Since defining an embryo as a person would 
make abortion legally tantamount to willful murder, state personhood 
statutes would effectively constitute an undue burden on a woman’s 
decision to have an abortion.  Therefore, embryonic personhood is 
unconstitutional under current United States legal precedent, despite 
attempts by states to advance it.251 
The remaining Organization of American States countries hold varied 
positions on embryonic personhood.  In Chile, where abortion is illegal in 
all circumstances,252 the ART community refers to very young fertilized 
 247.  See, e.g., Emily Crockett, Colorado Fetal ‘Personhood’ Amendment Will Be 
on 2014 Ballot, RH REALITY CHECK (Oct. 18, 2013, 3:08 PM), 
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/10/18/colorado-fetal-personhood-amendment-
will-be-on-2014-ballot/; Robin Marty, Personhood Squelched in Alaska, Pops Up in 
Iowa, RH REALITY CHECK (May 7, 2013, 12:12 PM), 
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/05/07/personhood-squelched-in-alaska-pops-up-
in-iowa/; Robin Marty, Ohio AG Approves “Personhood” Amendment Language, RH
REALITY CHECK (Jan. 2, 2012, 8:47AM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2012/01/02/ohio-ag-approves-personhood-amendment-
language/.   
 247.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992); Madalene Smith-
Huemer, 6 States Where Reproductive Rights Will Be Under Attack in 2014, POLICY
MIC (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.policymic.com/articles/78407/6-states-where-
reproductive-rights-will-be-under-attack-in-2014.   
248.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
 249.  Contra MICHELLE N. MEYER, THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV’T,
STATES’ REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES:  WHAT DOES THE
CONSTITUTION ALLOW? 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2009-07-States_Regulation_ART.pdf 
(“[U]nder our Constitutional framework, states—and not the federal government—are 
the most natural regulators of procreation.”).  
250.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. 
251.  See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 136, at 11. 
252.  See Chile Abortion Laws:  Senate Blocks Laws Lifting Ban on Abortions, 
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embryos as “pre-embryos” to skirt pressure from the Catholic Church.253  
However, the Chilean government does provide limited assistance to IVF 
through its public health program.254  Ecuador’s Constitution also codifies a 
complete ban on abortion, but IVF is unregulated and relatively 
prevalent.255  Unlike Argentina and Chile, the IVF community in Ecuador 
is not self-policing,256 and thus embryos have no apparent legal protection. 
In Canada, the case of Winnipeg Child Family Services v. G257 
established a legal precedent that a fetus is not a person and not entitled to 
the rights afforded to a person.258  Though Canada’s regulation of IVF is 
patchy at best and left largely to the provinces, there have been no 
unequivocal pronouncements on embryonic personhood from any Canadian 
governmental entities.  Thus, it is fair to conclude that Canada does not 
consider embryos as persons. 
In conclusion, it seems that most parties to the IACHR would not grant 
legal personhood to embryos.  Additionally, the IACHR does not see life as 
beginning at conception.259  Rather, the IACHR allows member states to 
regulate abortion and IVF as they see fit, so long as the regulations are not 
in contravention of other articles of the Convention.  Moreover, the IACHR 
has explicitly ruled that embryos are not persons,260 and that a total ban on 
IVF is contrary to the human rights to privacy,261 to found a family,262 and 
to reproductive autonomy.263 
C. African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) 
There is no case law available in the African Human Rights system that 
addresses embryonic or fetal personhood. However, there are a few cases 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 5, 2012, 3:26 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/05/chile-abortion-laws-bills-lifting-ban-
blocked_n_1406606.html; see also World Abortion Laws Map, supra note 217. 
 253.  See Elizabeth F.S. Roberts, Institutions That Matter:  IVF, Abortion and 
Reproductive Governance in Ecuador, STATES AT REGIONAL RISK, available at 
http://sarr.emory.edu/documents/Andes/Roberts.pdf.   
254.  See Smink, supra note 242. 
255.  See Roberts, supra note 253, at 6.   
256.  Id. 
257.  Winnipeg Child Family Servs. v. G, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925 (Can.).   
258.  Id. 
259.  Artavio Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) vs. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 138 (Nov. 28, 2012). 
260.  Id. at ¶ 221.   
261.  Id. at ¶¶ 146, 150, 285. 
262.  Id. at ¶¶ 150.   
263.  Id. at ¶¶ 144, 150.   
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that may be useful in determining the stance of African countries toward 
embryonic personhood.  In the case of Republic of Kenya v. Nyamu,264 the 
Kenyan High Court ruled that children are only considered “persons” under 
the law when they “[proceed] in a living state from [their] mother.”265  
South Africa’s Constitutional Court ruled similarly in The State v. 
Mushumpa and Best,266 ruling that a fetal death due to assault may 
aggravate a crime, but that killing the fetus itself is not murder.267  The 
Court noted that this determination would involve complicated questions of 
when a fetus becomes a person, thus further indicating that the Court 
believes that there is some stage where the fetus is not a person.268 
In 2003, the ACHPR made an explicit pronouncement on abortion.  The 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted by the ACHPR in 
2003, is the first human rights document to include a right to abortion.269  
Since this human rights body permits abortion, it is unlikely they would 
then grant personhood to an embryo only to take away that personhood 
once it becomes a fetus.  It remains to be seen how this decision might 
affect both fetal and embryonic personhood, especially as IVF becomes 
more widely available in African countries. 
V.  BIOETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Some may argue that international bodies have sufficiently addressed 
IVF technologies, thus precluding the need for an explicitly “human-rights” 
related pronouncement on IVF.  However, UN bodies have begun to 
confront bioethics questions involving embryos in the context of medical 
research,270 and one cannot ignore the connection between IVF and 
bioethics.271  As it stands, one of the great questions in bioethics in the 
 264.  See Case No. 81 of 2004 (Kenya High Court); CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., LEGAL
GROUNDS:  REPRODUCTIVE AND SEXUAL RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH
COURTS, VOLUME II 101 (2010), available at 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_legalground
s_vol2_2.10.pdf [hereinafter CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., LEGAL GROUNDS]. 
265.  Id. 
 266.  See State v. Mashumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E) at ¶ 62 (S. Afr.). See generally 
CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., LEGAL GROUNDS, supra note 264, at 98-99.  
267.  Mashumpa, 2008 (1) SACR at ¶¶ 62-63. 
268.  Id. 
 269.  See Rachel Rebouché, Health and Reproductive Rights in the Protocol to the 
African Charter: Competing Influences and Unsettling Questions, 16 WASH. & LEE J.
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 79, 105 (2009).   
 270.  Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, U.N. EDUC., SCI., AND
CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (2005), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.   
271.  See, e.g., Lawrence J. Nelson & Michael J. Meyer, Confronting Deep Moral 
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United States is what to do with cryopreserved embryos in a research 
context.272  In addressing these questions, ethics councils have issued 
various statements on just what sort of respect to accord the human 
embryo.273 
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR)274 
makes no explicit pronouncement about respect for embryos.  Granted, the 
UDBHR is meant to cover all fields of bioethics, and as such it would be 
impossible to address the ethical concerns of each area.  However, it is 
telling that the UDBHR makes several references to “human beings”—
respect for, privacy of, consent of, among others.275  Additionally, the 
UDBHR notes that the development of new technologies must contribute to 
“justice, equity, and to the interest of humanity,” and further states that 
paying attention to the position of women is an important barometer for 
determining “social realities.”276 
This language is promising.  It seems as though human rights 
pronouncements related to bioethics thus emphasize human beings – 
particularly women, who are most often affected by embryonic 
personhood277 – and not reproductive materials as those entities most 
affected by bioethics.  While bioethics and IVF cannot be fully conflated, 
the UDBHR can serve as an important reference point for including IVF 
considerations where they should belong—in conversations about life, 
privacy, non-discrimination, and the “reproductive rights” umbrella. 
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Most human rights bodies have implied or directly pronounced that 
neither fetuses nor embryos have existing rights as persons.  Using the 
Disagreement:  The President’s Council on Bioethics, Moral Status, and Human 
Embryos, 5 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 33 (2005); Francoise Shenfield, et al., European 
Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology Task Force on Ethics and Law, The 
Moral Status of the Pre-Implantation Embryo, 16 HUM. REPROD. 1046 (2001).   
272.  See Shenfield et al., supra note 148, at 1047. 
273.  See, e.g., id.  
 274.  United Nations Educational, Sci., and Cultural Org. Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights, (Oct. 19, 2005), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.   
275.  Id.   
276.  Id. 
 277.  Although embryonic personhood affects everyone involved in childbearing 
and childrearing, because women are disproportionately involved in the IVF process, 
and because women are more likely than men to seek out procedures such as abortion, 
in which embryonic personhood is also implicated, I posit that women, more so than 
other groups, are most affected by embryonic personhood.  
40
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss4/1
2014] EMBRYONIC PERSONHOOD 821 
principle that human rights law would be unlikely to grant rights to 
reproductive materials at an early stage, take them away again, and then re-
grant them at birth, embryonic personhood would be a violation of already 
existing human rights norms.  This conclusion is important when 
considering rights of access for infertile278 couples and individuals to 
burgeoning technologies such as IVF.  In these cases, personhood 
legislation would likely cause considerable complications for the IVF 
process.279 One major complication would be the preclusion of embryonic 
destruction: whether due to disinterest or due to an already successful IVF 
procedure.280 
If analyzed in the context of the way the human rights system has treated 
abortion, the very idea of embryonic personhood is incompatible with the 
right to privacy and the right to life.281  Similar to the way that granting a 
fetus personhood abrogates a person’s autonomy to decide whether or not 
to carry a pregnancy to term, embryonic personhood would also abrogate 
this autonomy.282  Courts have already made various pronouncements 
respecting a woman’s right to privacy and life in reproductive health 
decisions.283  Logically, they can and will do the same with respect to 
embryonic personhood, which strongly implicates reproductive decisions, 
just as the IACHR chose to do.284 
278.  In all its permutations – medical, social, and elective. 
279.  See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 10, at 101-04. 
280.  Id. at 100. 
 281.  Because personhood rights threaten abortion rights, it is also arguable that 
under human rights law they similarly threaten a woman’s right to health.  See Zampas 
& Gher, supra note 15, at 252.   
282.  Cf. CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 136, at 14. 
 283.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153  (1973) (“[T]his right of privacy . . . 
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”); see also R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.R. 30, 32-33 (Can.) (noting that 
the criminalization of abortion interferes with a woman’s bodily integrity and security 
of person); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, 
Sentencia C-355/06, § II (1) (Colom.), available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-355-06.htm (noting that the 
decision to have a child falls within the privacy sphere); Rex v. Bourne, (1938) 1 K.B. 
687, 695 (U.K.); Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶¶ 146, 150, 281, 285,  (Nov. 28, 2012) 
(concluding that a ban on IVF violates privacy and reproductive autonomy); K.L. v. 
Peru, Judgment U.N. Human Rights Comm., No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005), available at 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/KL%20HRC%2
0final%20decision.pdf (noting that Peru’s failure to allow K.L. to have an abortion was 
a privacy violation).  
284.  See Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 ¶ 244. 
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The IACHR ruled that laws based on embryonic personhood outlawing 
IVF violate the right to found a family.285  In the sense of IVF, as the 
IACHR noted, the right to found a family is closely tied to the right to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.286  Here, science has made possible 
a way for infertile couples and individuals to become genetic parents. 
Thus, it is a violation of human rights law to say that embryonic 
personhood precludes access to IVF.287  Therefore, where embryonic 
personhood justifications are used to limit or ban IVF, the right to found a 
family is violated. 
The right to non-discrimination may be less readily invoked regarding 
embryonic personhood.  Though the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has implied that non-discrimination may be implicated if 
infertility is considered a disability,288 human rights bodies should be able 
to declare discrimination against infertile people using infertility as a 
characteristic in its own right, separate from disability.  The idea of 
discrimination is based on equal treatment under the law, and it is 
unnecessary to put infertility in the disability box in order to find a 
violation of the right to non-discrimination where access to IVF is 
obstructed by the state.  Thus, embryonic personhood in and of itself is 
discriminatory against infertile people, regardless of infertility’s 
classification as a disability. 
Finally, embryonic personhood violates reproductive autonomy, and the 
treatment of embryonic personhood by the courts should note this fact.  The 
IACHR ruled that precluding access to IVF abrogates the reproductive 
autonomy of infertile couples by taking away a choice to become genetic 
parents where that choice should be available.289  The Court further held 
that reproductive rights are paramount in considering the effects of a ban 
on IVF.290  Reproductive justice requires that the existence of a 
reproductive right be coupled with access to that right.291  For those who 
285.  See id. at ¶¶ 146, 150. 
286.  See id. at ¶ 150.  
287.  See id. at ¶¶ 146, 150.  
 288.  See id. at ¶ 138 (quoting Representative Molina of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights who was quoted in the decision as saying that infertility 
qualifies as a disability, and that the infertile couples in this case were discriminated 
against for their infertility-disability.  The Court does not affirm this statement, but 
merely acknowledges that it was made).   
289.  See id. at ¶¶ 143-50.  
290.  See id. at ¶¶ 152-54.  
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wish to procreate using IVF, reproductive justice is denied and 
reproductive rights are violated where access to IVF is obstructed or taken 
away, especially where embryonic personhood is used as a justification. 
The idea of embryonic personhood further endangers other reproductive 
rights, such as abortion.292 
International human rights bodies and individual countries must take 
their cues from the IACHR and address IVF technologies in their 
conception of other rights tied to reproduction.  Embryonic personhood, 
while not explicitly addressed by human rights treaties or treaty bodies 
aside from the IACHR, should be discouraged under international human 
rights law.  The implications of embryonic personhood on the right to life, 
privacy, the right to found a family, the right to non-discrimination, and 
reproductive rights are sweeping, and it is important that international 
human rights law continues to recognize human beings, and not their 
reproductive materials, as rights-bearers under the law. 
mid=81 (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
 292.  See Ed Goldman, The Conflict Between Fetal Personhood Laws and Women’s 
Rights, JURIST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/ed-goldman-
personhood-laws.php (discussing the legal implications for personhood laws in the 
United States).   
43
Paulk: Embyonic Personhood: Implications for Assisted Reproductive Techn
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
